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This article explains the various meanings and ambiguities of the phrase “teaching 
to the test” (TttT), describes its history and use as a pejorative, and outlines the 
policy implications of the popular, but fallacious, belief that “high stakes” testing 
induces TttT which, in turn, produces “test score inflation” or artificial test score 
gains. The history starts with the infamous “Lake Wobegon Effect” test score 
scandal in the US in the 1980s. John J. Cannell, a medical doctor, discovered that 
all US states administering national norm-referenced tests claimed their students’ 
average scores exceeded the national average, a mathematical impossibility. 
Cannell blamed educator cheating and lax security for the test score inflation, but 
education insiders managed to convince many that high stakes was the cause, 
despite the fact that Cannell’s tests had no stakes. Elevating the high stakes causes 
TttT, which causes test score inflation fallacy to dogma has served to divert 
attention from the endemic lax security with “internally administered” tests that 
should have encouraged policy makers to require more external controls in test 
administrations. The fallacy is partly responsible for promoting the ruinous 
practice of test preparation drilling on test format and administering practice tests 
as a substitute for genuine subject matter preparation. Finally, promoters of the 
fallacy have encouraged the practice of “auditing” allegedly untrustworthy high-
stakes test score trends with score trends from allegedly trustworthy low-stakes 
tests, despite an abundance of evidence that low-stakes test scores are far less 
reliable, largely due to student disinterest. 
Keywords: Test security, Educator cheating, Test score inflation, High stakes, 
Standardized tests, Education. 
Este artículo explica los diversos significados y ambigüedades de la frase "enseñar  
para el examen" (TttT: teaching to the test en inglés), describe su historia y su uso 
como un peyorativo, y describe las implicaciones políticas de la creencia popular, 
pero falaz, que las pruebas de a “gran escala” inducen TttT que, a su vez, produce 
una "inflación en la calificación obtenida en el examen" o ganancias em cuanto a los 
puntos obtenidos en la prueba. La historia comienza con el infame escándalo de la 
puntuación de la prueba "Lake Wobegon Effect" en los Estados Unidos en los años 
ochenta. John J. Cannell, un médico, descubrió que todos los estados de los Estados 
Unidos que administraban pruebas nacionales con referencias normativas 
afirmaban que los puntajes promedio de sus estudiantes excedían el promedio 
nacional, una imposibilidad matemática. Cannell atribuyó a los educadores el 
engaño y la seguridad laxa por la inflación de la puntuación de los exámenes, pero 
los expertos en educación lograron convencer a muchos de que las pruebas a gran 
escala eran la causa, a pesar de que las pruebas de Cannell no tenían ninguna 
fiabilidad. Exagerar las pruebas a gran escala hace que TttT hace que la falla de la 
inflación de la puntuación de la prueba al dogma haya servido para desviar la 
atención de la seguridad laxa endémica con pruebas "internamente administradas" 
que deberían haber alentado a los responsables políticos a exigir más controles 
externos en las administraciones de las pruebas. La falacia es en parte responsable 
de promover la práctica ruinosa en la preparación de las pruebas en el formato de 
prueba y la administración de pruebas prácticas como un sustituto de la preparación 





práctica de "auditar" tendencias de determinadas puntuación en las pruebas a gran 
escala con las tendencias de puntuación presuntamente confiables de las pruebas de 
baja exigencia, a pesar de la abundancia de pruebas donde las puntuaciones de las 
pruebas a menor escala son mucho menos confiables debido al desinterés de los 
estudiantes.  
Palabras clave: Prueba de seguridad, Engaño de educador, Inflación de la 
puntuación del examen, Pruebas a gran escala, Pruebas estandarizadas, Educación. 
1. Introduction 
Standardized testing is one of the few means by which the public may ascertain what 
transpires inside school classrooms and, by far, the most objective.  
For those inside education who would prefer to be left alone to operate schools as they 
wish, externally managed standardized tests intrude. Many actively encourage public 
skepticism of those tests’ validity. Promoting the concept of “teaching to the test” as a 
pejorative is one part of the effort (Phelps, 2011c).  
But, the meaning of the phrase is ambiguous (Shepard ,1990; Popham, 2004). At worst, 
it suggests grossly lax test security: teachers know the exact contents of an upcoming 
test and expose their students to that content, thereby undermining the test as an 
objective measure. Some testing critics would have the public believe that this is always 
possible. It is not. When tests are secure, the exact contents are unknown to teachers 
and test-takers alike until the moment scheduled testing begins and they hear 
instructions such as “please break open the seal of your test booklet”.   
More often, the phrase “teaching to the test” (TttT) is used pejoratively when it 
allegedly induces teachers to reduce the quality of instruction. There are two ways this 
can happen. 
First, TttT allegedly lowers educational quality due to the limitations of tests. Critics 
suggest that tests—or, typically, externally managed standardized tests—are not well 
correlated with learning. These tests cannot measure all that students learn, perhaps not 
even most of, or the best parts of, what they learn. If true, then teaching only those 
components of learning that tests can capture neglects other, allegedly important, 
components of learning. 
For a skeptic, the assertion begs the question: if tests do not measure important 
components of learning, how do we know those components exist? The philosopher and 
mathematician René Descartes is said to have written, “If a thing exists, it exists in some 
amount. If it exists in some amount, it is capable of being measured”. Was he wrong? 
Are there types of learning that teacher-made tests can capture, but standardized tests 
cannot? …that teachers can ascertain, but tests cannot? Is some learning simply 
immeasurable? 
Most outside education probably assume that if a student cannot demonstrate a certain 
knowledge or skill on a test, that student probably does not possess that knowledge or 
skill.  
Some inside education argue that standardized tests can only assess “lower-order skills” 
or “factual recall”. So, teachers avoid more enlightening and challenging instruction in 
favor of the mundane and simple. Without tests, they argue, teachers teach and students 
learn higher and deeper knowledge and skills that cannot be validly assessed by 
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standardized tests. Rather, better knowledge and skills can only validly be assessed by 
methods that require a large amount of teacher observation and judgment. Long-term 
or group projects are sometimes mentioned as good vehicles for the demonstration of 
“better” student knowledge and skills. 
The second way that “teaching to the test” allegedly lowers instructional quality is 
through test preparation. “Test prep” occurs in a variety of forms. The simplest form 
familiarizes test-takers with the structure and format of the test, and is unrelated to 
subject matter content. Format familiarization is particularly important when the 
format of an upcoming test is, …well… unfamiliar. If students, for example, have never 
seen a multiple-choice test item before, some instruction and practice can be helpful. 
Opinions differ about how much instruction and practice is appropriate. Most testing 
experts and test developers advocate only a brief amount of time. How much time does 
it take to understand how to respond to a multiple-choice test item, after all? When a 
test format is so convoluted that extensive training is required to use it, format decoding 
may have become the skill being tested. Psychometricians would then say the test has 
“construct-irrelevant variance”-that is, it is testing skills and knowledge different from 
the intended “construct” (i.e., the subject matter content). 
Many testing opponents and some test preparation companies, however, argue that 
extended practice (i.e., “drilling”) on test format and practice tests can improve test 
performance (Fraker, 1986-87; Smyth, 1990; Marte, 2011). Unfortunately, some school 
personnel believe them and convert their classrooms into “test prep factories”, halting 
regular subject-matter instruction in favor of instruction on standardized test formats, 
drilling with test-maker-provided workbooks, or administering practice tests (Shepard 
1990).  
All educators consider this type of TttT unfortunate and debilitating to learning. 
Educators disagree, however, as to whether it works to increase test scores.  
Teaching to the test’s negative connotations can befuddle naïve education outsiders who 
assume a natural complementary relationship between teacher instruction and student 
testing. Shouldn’t teachers teach subject matter that will be on the test? Shouldn’t a test 
include subject matter a teacher covered in class? Why would a teacher teach “away 
from the test”—deliberating teach subject matter that will not be tested or, conversely, 
test subject matter that was not taught?  
If a test is aligned with subject-matter standards, and its questions thoroughly cover 
them, can responsible teachers avoid teaching to the test? (Gardner, 2008). 
2. A short history of US educators cheating on tests 
Teaching to the test (TttT) is far more than a catch phrase or slogan, however. It has 
served for three decades to divert attention from a more serious problem in education in 
the United States-educators cheating on assessments used to judge their own 
performance. To elaborate adequately requires a short history lesson first. 
Arguably, the current prevalence of large-scale testing in the United States began in the 
late 1970s. Some statistical indicators revealed a substantial decline in student 
achievement from the early 1960s on. Many blamed perceived permissiveness and 





testing-at least of the most basic skills-was proposed to monitor the situation. For 
motivation, some states added consequences to the tests, typically requiring a certain 
score for high school graduation. 
With few exceptions (e.g., California, Iowa, New York), however, states had little recent 
experience in developing or administering standardized tests or writing statewide 
content standards. That activity had been deferred to schools and school districts. So, 
they chose the expedient of purchasing “off the shelf” tests-nationally norm-referenced 
tests (NRTs)1 (Phelps 2008/2009a; 2010). Outside the states of Iowa or California, the 
subject matter content of NRTs matched that of no state. Rather, each covered a 
pastiche of content, a generic set thought to be fairly common. 
Starting in the 1970s, the state of Florida required its high school students to exceed a 
certain score on one of these. Those who did not were denied diplomas, even if they met 
all other graduation requirements. 
A group of 10 African-American students who were denied high school diplomas after 
failing three times to pass Florida’s graduation test sued the state superintendent of 
education (Buckendahl and Hunt, 2007). The plaintiffs claimed that they had had neither 
adequate nor equal opportunity to master the “curriculum” on which the test was based. 
Ultimately, four different federal courtrooms would host various phases of the trial of 
Debra P. v. Turlington between 1979 and 1984. 
“Debra P.” won the case after a study revealed a wide disparity between what was 
taught in classrooms to meet state curricular standards and the curriculum embedded in 
the test questions. A federal court ordered the state to stop denying diplomas for at least 
four years while a new cohort of students worked its way through a revised curriculum 
at Florida high schools and faced a test aligned to that curriculum.  
The Debra P. decision disallowed the use of NRTs for consequential, or “high-stakes”, 
decisions. But, many states continued to use them for other purposes. Some were still 
paying for them anyway under multi-year contracts. Typically, states continued to use 
NRTs as systemwide diagnostic and monitoring assessments, with no consequences tied 
to the results.  
Enter a young medical resident working in a high-poverty region of rural West Virginia 
in the mid-1980s. He heard local school officials claim that their children scored above 
the national average on standardized tests. Skeptical, he investigated further and 
ultimately discovered that every U.S. state administering NRTs claimed to score above 
the national average, a statistical impossibility. The phenomenon was tagged the “Lake 
Wobegon Effect” after Garrison Keillor’s “News from Lake Wobegon” radio comedy 
sketch, in which “all the children are above average”. 
The West Virginia doctor, John Jacob Cannell, M.D., would move on to practice his 
profession in New Mexico and, later, California, but not before documenting his 
investigations in two self-published books, How All Fifty States Are above the National 
Average and How Public Educators Cheat on Standardized Achievement Tests. (Cannell, 
1987, 1989)  
                                                     
1 Such as the Iowa Tests of Basic Skills (ITBS), Iowa Test of Educational Development (ITED), 
Stanford Achievement Test (the “other SAT”), or the California Test of Basic Skills (CTBS). 
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Cannell listed all the states and all the tests involved in his research. Naturally, all the 
tests involved were nationally normed, off-the-shelf, commercial tests, the type that the 
Debra P. v. Turlington decision had disallowed for use with student stakes. It is only 
because they were nationally normed that comparisons could be made between their 
jurisdictions’ average scores and national averages.  
By the time Cannell conducted his investigation in the mid- to late-1980s, about twenty 
states had developed Debra P-compliant high-stakes state tests, along with state content 
standards to which they were aligned. But, with the single exception of a Texas test2, 
none of them was comparable to any other, nor to any national benchmark. They were 
“criterion-referenced” or “standards-based” tests unique to each state, and not nationally 
norm-referenced tests. And, again with Texas excepted, Cannell did not analyze them. 
Dr. Cannell cited educator dishonesty and lax security in test administrations as the 
primary culprits of the Lake Wobegon Effect, also known as “test score inflation” or 
“artificial test score gains”.  
With stakes no longer attached, security protocols for the NRTs were considered 
unnecessary, and relaxed. It was common for states and school districts to have 
purchased the NRTs “off the shelf” and handle all aspects of test administration 
themselves. Moreover, to reduce costs, they could reuse the same test forms (and test 
items) year after year. Even if some educators did not intentionally cheat, over time they 
became familiar with the test forms and items and could easily prepare their students for 
them. With test scores rising over time, administrators and elected officials discovered 
that they could claim credit for increasing learning. 
Conceivably, one could argue that the boastful education administrators were 
“incentivized” to inflate their students’ academic achievement. But, incentives exist both 
as sticks and carrots. Stakes are sticks. There were no stakes attached to these tests. In 
many cases, the administrators were not even obligated to publicize the scores. 
Certainly, they were not required to issue boastful press releases attributing the 
apparent student achievement increases to their own managerial prowess. The incentive 
in the Lake Wobegon Effect scandal was a carrot-specifically, self-aggrandizement on 
the part of education officials. 
Regardless the fact that no stakes attached to Cannell’s tests, however, prominent 
education researchers blamed “high stakes” for the test-score inflation he found (Koretz 
et al., 1991). Cannell had exhorted the nation to pay attention to a serious problem of 
educator dishonesty and lax test security, but education insiders co-opted his discovery 
and turned it to their own advantage (Phelps, 2006). 
“There are many reasons for the Lake Wobegon Effect, most of which are less sinister 
than those emphasized by Cannell” (Linn, 2000, p.7) said the co-director of a federally-
                                                     
2 The Texas TEAMS was a hybrid, partly a complete NRT, but with other test items added to 
thoroughly cover state content standards. The NRT portion was used to make national 






funded research center on educational testing-for over three decades the only federally-
funded research center on educational testing.3  
Another of the center’s scholars added: 
Scores on high-stakes tests—tests that have serious consequences for students or teachers—
often become severely inflated. That is, gains in scores on these tests are often far larger than 
true gains in students' learning. Worse, this inflation is highly variable and unpredictable, 
so one cannot tell which school's scores are inflated and which are legitimate. (Koretz, 
2008, p. 131) 
These assertions supply the many educators predisposed to dislike high-stakes tests 
anyway a seemingly scientific (and seemingly not self-serving or ideological) argument 
for opposing them. Meanwhile, they present policymakers a conundrum: if scores on 
high-stakes tests improve, likely they are meaningless-leaving them no objective and 
reliable measure of school improvement. So they might just as well do nothing as bother 
doing anything. 
After Dr. Cannell left the debate and went on to practice medicine, these education 
professors and their colleagues would repeat the mantra many times-high stakes (not 
lax security) cause test-score inflation-in dozens of reports published both by their 
center and by the National Research Council, whose educational testing research 
function they have co-opted (Baker, 2000; Linn, 2000; Linn, Graue, & Sanders, 1990; 
Shepard, 1990, 2000). 
Cannell's main points-that educator cheating was rampant and test security inadequate-
were dismissed out of hand and persistently ignored thereafter. The educational 
consensus fingered "teaching to the test" for the crime, manifestly under pressure from 
the high stakes of the tests. 
Cannell’s tests had no stakes. That’s a fact anyone can verify. The tests he included in 
his analysis are listed in his reports. Indeed, with the Debra P. decision settled in the 
federal courts in the early 1980s, Cannell’s tests could not legally have had stakes. 
Nonetheless, ask most anyone inside education today for the primary lesson to emerge 
from Dr. Cannell’s famous “Lake Wobegon Effect” studies, and they will tell you: high-
stakes induces teaching to the test, which induces test-score inflation-artificial increases 
in test scores unrelated to actual gains in student learning.  
On the one hand, it is astonishing that they stick with the notion because it is so 
obviously wrong. The SAT and ACT university admission tests have stakes-one’s score 
on either helps determine which university one attends. But, they have shown no 
evidence of test-score inflation. (Indeed, the SAT was re-centered in the 1990s because 
of score deflation.) The most high-stakes tests of all-occupational licensure tests-show no 
evidence of test-score inflation. Both licensure tests and the SAT and ACT, however, 
have been administered with tight security and ample test form and item rotation. 
 
                                                     
3 Since the early 1980s, the Center for Research on Educational Standards and Student Testing 
(CRESST) has been continually headquartered in UCLA’s education school, and continually 
partnered with the University of Colorado’s and the University of Pittsburgh’s education schools. 
Other partners have included the Rand Corporation, and the education schools at Arizona State 
University, Stanford University, and at other University of California campuses. 
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3. Spot the Causal Factor 
Table 1. Security and Stakes in evaluation 






No test-score inflation 
 
e.g., SAT, ACT, licensure exams 
Test-score inflation possible 
 
e.g., some internally administered district 
and state exams 
No/low 
stakes 
No test-score inflation 
 
e.g., National Assessment of 
Educational Progress (NAEP) 
Test-score inflation possible 
 
e.g., Cannell’s “Lake Wobegon” exams 
Source: Auhor. 
On the other hand, this “folk belief” is not unlike others in the US education school 
catechism, such as learning styles, multiple intelligences, and discovery learning: 
consistently proven wrong, but persisting nonetheless and matching the radical 
egalitarian and progressive education ideals that have consumed US schools of 
education. 
The belief fits well into the knowledge base that many US education professors want to 
believe is true, rather than that which is true. US educationist doctrine may be less 
about a search for truth, and more an aspiration to what should be true -a set of 
knowledge they consider better because they consider it morally superior. 
The late senator from New York, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, famously said “Everyone is 
entitled to their own opinion, but not their own set of facts”4. Apparently, US education 
professors do not agree. They have successfully elevated panoply of falsehoods aligned 
with their preferences to “facts” in the collective working memory. Their faux facts may 
influence US education policy-making more than real ones.  
The scholars at the federally funded research center followed Cannell’s studies with two 
of their own purporting to demonstrate both that teaching to the test works to 
artificially inflate test scores, and that high stakes induce teaching to the test. Both 
studies are methodologically flawed beyond the point of salvaging (Phelps, 2008, 2009a, 
2010). Nevertheless, they remain, along with the distortion of Dr. Cannell’s studies, 
highly respected among the US education professoriate and the foundation for most 
educators’ understanding of the nature and implications of teaching-to-the-test 
(Crocker, 2005). 
The reasoning goes like this: under pressure to raise test scores by any means possible, 
teachers reduce the amount of time devoted to regular instruction and, instead, focus on 
test preparation that can be subject-matter free (i.e., test preparation or test coaching). 
Test scores rise, but students learn less (Koretz, 1992, 1996; Koretz et al., 1991). 
The two foundational studies examined certain patterns in the pre- and post-test scores 
from the first decade (i.e., late 1970s and early 1980s) of the federal government’s 
compensatory education program (Linn, 2000) and the “preliminary findings” from the 






early 1990s of a test “perceived to be high stakes” in one school district (Koretz, Linn, 
Dunbar, & Shepard, 1991). 
Research conducted on this hypothesis by others concludes that teachers who spend 
more than a brief amount of time focused on test preparation do their students more 
harm than good5. Their students score lower on the tests than do other students whose 
teachers eschew any test preparation beyond simple format familiarization and, instead, 
use the time for regular subject-matter instruction (see, for example, Allensworth, 
Correa, & Ponisciak, 2008; Camara, 2008; Crocker, 2005; Moore, 1991; Palmer, 2002). 
Moreover, students who know the specific content of prep tests beforehand may be 
lulled into a false confidence, study less, learn less, and score lower on final exams than 
those who do not (see, for example, Tuckman, 1994; Tuckman & Trimble, 1997). 
The more widespread the belief that tests can be gamed by learning tricks unrelated to 
subject matter acquisition, the more customers and profits they gain.  
As it turns out, neither of the two foundational studies of high-stakes testing effects 
included high-stakes tests. The researchers crossed their fingers behind their backs and 
employed an archaic, overly broad definition for the term “high stakes” for which 
virtually any standardized test would qualify (Phelps, 2010).6 Yes, what they used was a 
definition, but it was neither the standard industry definition nor one that anyone 
outside their circle would reasonably assume for the term.7 
This “floating definition” semantic sleight-of-hand is commonplace in US education 
research, its frequency of use grossly underappreciated by journalists and policy-makers. 
Education researchers surreptitiously substitute an obscure connotation for a term that 
varies from the more commonly understood denotation and explain the substitution, 
when they explain it at all, only in the fine print (Phelps, 2010).  
One of the two studies was conducted in a school district and with tests that remain 
unidentified (Koretz, 2008). To this day, the researchers claim that they must keep that 
information secret to “protect” their sources (from what is not explained) (Staradamskis, 
2008). 
                                                     
5 Messick & Jungeblut (1981); DerSimonian & Laird (1983); Kulik, Bangert-Drowns, & Kulik 
(1984); Whitla (1988); Snedecor (1989); Becker (1990); Powers (1993); Allalouf & Ben-Shakhar 
(1998); Camara (1999); Powers & Rock (1999); Robb & Ercanbrack (1999); Briggs (2001); Zehr 
(2001); Briggs & Hansen (2004); Wainer (2011); Marte (2011); and Arendasy, Sommer, 
Gutierrez-Lobos, & Punter (2016). 
6 CRESST researchers cited (Shepard, 1990, p.17) a definition they attribute to James Popham 
from 1987 ascribing “high stakes” to any test whose aggregate results were reported publicly or 
which received media coverage. With the widespread passage of “truth in testing” and other open 
records laws, starting with California and New York State in the late 1970s, the aggregate 
results of all large-scale tests became public record. By their out-of-date definition, ALL large-
scale tests are “high stakes”. 
7 The standard, industry-wide definition of “high stakes” could be found in the Standards for 
Educational and Psychological Testing (AERA et al.), “High-stakes test. A test used to provide 
results that have important, direct consequences for examinees, programs, or institutions 
involved in the testing” (p.176) “Low-stakes test. A test used to provide results that have only 
minor or indirect consequences for examinees, programs, or institutions involved in the testing” 
(p.178).  
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Secret definitions. Secret locations. Secret tests. Such studies may stand forever because 
they are neither replicable nor falsifiable. More like religion than science; they require 
faith. And, inside U.S. education one finds many willing believers.  
Meanwhile, a cornucopia of studies contradicting the two research center studies have 
been repeatedly declared nonexistent by the same researchers and thousands of 
sympathetic others inside US education schools (Phelps, 2005, 2008, 2009b, 2012a, 
2012b). 
Elevating teaching-to-the-test to dogma, from the beginning with the distortion of Dr. 
Cannell’s findings, has served to divert attention from scandals that should have 
threatened US educators’ almost complete control of their own evaluation.8 Had the 
scandal Dr. Cannell uncovered been portrayed honestly to the public-educators cheat on 
tests administered internally with lax security-the obvious solution would have been to 
externally manage all assessments (Oliphant, 2011). 
More recent test cheating scandals in Atlanta, Washington, D.C., and elsewhere once 
again drew attention to a serious problem. But, instead of blaming lax security and 
internally managed test administration, most educators blamed the stakes and alleged 
undue pressure that allegedly ensues (Phelps, 2011a). Their recommendation, as usual: 
drop the stakes and reduce the amount of testing. Never mind the ironies: they want 
oversight lifted so they may operate with none, and they admit that they cannot be 
trusted to administer tests to our children properly, but we should trust them to educate 
our children properly if we leave them alone. 
Perhaps the most profound factoids revealed by the more recent scandals were, first, 
that the cheating had continued for ten years in Atlanta before any responsible person 
attempted to stop it and, even then, it required authorities outside the education 
industry to report the situation honestly. Second, in both Atlanta and Washington, DC, 
education industry test security consultants repeatedly declared the systems free of 
wrongdoing (Phelps, 2011b).  
Meanwhile, thirty years after J. J. Cannell first showed us how lax security leads to 
corrupted test scores, regardless the stakes, test security remains cavalierly loose in the 
United States. We have teachers administering state tests in their own classrooms to 
their own students, principals distributing and collecting test forms in their own 
schools. Security may be high outside the schoolhouse door, but inside, too much is left 
                                                     
8 More than in most countries, the U.S. public education system is independent, self-contained, 
and self-renewing. Education professionals staffing school districts make the hiring, purchasing, 
and school catchment-area boundary-line decisions. School district boundaries often differ from 
those of other governmental jurisdictions, confusing the electorate. In many jurisdictions, school 
officials set the dates for votes on bond issues or school board elections, and can do so to their 
advantage. Those school officials are trained, and socialized, in graduate schools of education. A 
half-century ago, most faculties in graduate schools of education may have received their own 
professional training in core disciplines, such as Psychology, Sociology, or Business 
Management. Today, most education school faculty are themselves education school graduates, 
socialized in the prevailing culture. The dominant expertise in schools of education can maintain 
its dominance by hiring faculty who agree with it and denying tenure to those who stray. The 
dominant expertise in education journals can control education knowledge by accepting article 
submissions with agreeable results and rejecting those without. Even most testing and 






to chance. And, as it turns out, educators are as human as the rest of us; some of them 
cheat and not all of them manage to keep test materials secure, even when they aren’t 
intentionally cheating. 
4. Codifying TttT falsehoods 
The primary advocates of the high-stakes-causes-TttT-which-causes-test-score-
inflation belief (hereafter HS->TttT->TSI), reside at the Center for Research on 
Educational Standards and Student Testing (CRESST), for over three decades the only 
federally funded research center on educational testing. CRESST staff led the effort to 
discredit the work and findings of J. J. Cannell, the earnest medical doctor who 
uncovered the Lake Wobegon Effect scandal in the 1980s. 
First, they rejected out of hand Cannell’s contentions that educator cheating on tests 
was rampant and test security too lax. Second, in promoting HS->TttT->TSI, they 
instilled doubt in the reliability and validity of high-stakes test results. 
Rather than stop there, however, they have advocated for thirty years that allegedly 
unreliable high-stakes test results should be “audited” by parallel low- or no-stakes 
tests. They reasoned that no-stakes test scores are reliable because there exist no 
incentives to cheat on them.  
A cornucopia of research exists contradicting CRESST’s faith in the reliability of low- 
and no-stakes test scores.9 No matter, CRESST researchers have simply ignored it.  
In summary, they promote all of the following beliefs: 
1) HS->TttT->TSI. Again, as the theory’s primary advocate writes, 
2) “Scores on high-stakes tests-tests that have serious consequences for students or 
teachers-often become severely inflated. That is, gains in scores on these tests 
are often far larger than true gains in students’ learning. Worse, this inflation is 
highly variable and unpredictable, so one cannot tell which school’s scores are 
inflated and which are legitimate”. 
3) Subject-matter independent training in test taking works to increase test scores 
(as some test prep companies also claim). 
4) High-stakes test scores are, at best, only partly related to subject matter 
mastery, because they are also highly correlated with subject-matter-free test-
taking skills. 
5) The cause of educator cheating in testing administrations is high-stakes; 
without high-stakes, educators do not cheat. 
6) No- or low-stakes tests, by contrast, are not susceptible to test-score inflation 
because there are no incentives to manipulate scores. 
The public policy implications of these beliefs are substantial. Given the statements 
above, responsible public policy should incorporate the following: 
                                                     
9 See, for example, Brown & Walberg (1993); Wise & DeMars (2005); Eklof (2007); Abdelfattah 
(2010); Barry, Horst, Finney, Brown, & Kopp (2010); Wise & DeMars (2010); Wainer (2011); 
Zilberberg, Anderson, Finney, & Marsh (2013); Steedle (2014); Liu, Rios, & Borden (2015); 
Sessoms & Finney (2015); Smith, Given, Julien, Ouellette, & DeLong (2015); Mathers, Finney, & 
Myers (2016); and Rios, Guo, Mao, & Liu (2016). 
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a) In the interest of improving test scores, teachers should teach to high-stakes 
tests—that is, drill on test format. They should reduce the amount of time 
devoted to subject matter mastery-to regular instruction and learning-and, 
instead, devote more time to taking practice tests, coaching students on test-
taking strategies, familiarizing their students with standardized test formats, 
etc. 
b) Use of test prep services should be encouraged. Moreover, in the interest of 
fairness, these services should be subsidized, at least for poorer students. 
c) If score trends for high-stakes tests are unreliable and those for no- or low-
stakes tests are reliable, no- or low-stakes tests may be used validly as shadow 
tests to audit the reliability of high-stakes tests’ score trends.  
d) Test security (or, the integrity of test materials) is not an issue with no- or low-
stakes tests, so they can be validly administered without security controls. 
e) Or, eliminate the use of high stakes tests entirely. Given that they provide 
neither valid nor reliable information, there is no excuse for using them. 
Currently, high stakes tests are used for certification and licensure in most 
professions and trades. 
Several years ago, CRESST staff occupied prominent positions on the committee 
drafting an update to the Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing (AERA, 
APA, NCME, 1999), arguably the most important document in testing. Left in charge of 
drafting a new chapter 13 on public policy, CRESST staff incorporated their set of 
beliefs and the logical policy recommendations derived therefrom (Phelps, 2011b).  
Judging from comments on the draft Standards made publicly available, I was the only 
public critic of the CRESST draft chapter 13. I recommended deleting it completely. As 
it turns out, an intervention occurred and the chapter was overhauled to remove the 
most egregious pseudoscientific claims and recommendations (AERA, NCME, & APA, 
2013). 
But, what if I hadn’t raised a fuss? Did I represent the only barrier between the 
Standards incorporating CRESST’s TttT Family of Fallacies and Standards based on 
genuine research evidence? That would be frightening. But, I witnessed no one else 
raising anything more than trivial objections to draft chapter 13.  
A Pyrrhic victory? Meanwhile, the TttT Family of Fallacies has received warm 
welcomes at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
and the educational testing office at the World Bank (Phelps, 2014). These international 
organizations promote these falsehoods worldwide. 
5. What if lax test security causes test score inflation? 
Thousands of externally imposed high-stakes tests show no evidence of test-score 
inflation. Likewise, low- and no-stakes tests notoriously lead to test-score inflation when 
test security (or, “the integrity of test materials”) is lax. The necessary and sufficient 
condition for test-score inflation is lax security, not high stakes. 
Reject the pseudoscience of the TttT Family of Fallacies and quite different public 





1) Test scores and test score trends should not be trusted in the absence of test 
security controls, no matter what the stakes. 
2) High-stakes test scores and score trends are typically not only valid and reliable 
when administered with tight security, they are more likely to be valid and 
reliable because they are more likely to be administered with tight security than 
low- and no-stakes tests 
3) Educators are normal human beings, and respond to a variety of incentives, just 
like the rest of us. By cheating on no- or low-stakes tests, educators might then 
publicize and take credit for the ostensible student learning increases. Note, 
however, that no “stakes” are involved; rather, self-aggrandizement is the 
motive. 
4) Drilling on test format not only does not improve learning, because it takes time 
away from subject matter instruction, it reduces it. 
5) Money spent on test preparation services is money wasted if the service consists 
primarily of test-taking strategies, format familiarity, and practice test taking.  
Given the statements above, responsible public policy should incorporate the following: 
a) Consider test security (or, the “integrity of test materials”) far more seriously 
than it has been, and applicable to many no-or low-stakes tests. 
b) Encourage teachers to devote only a modicum of time to familiarizing their 
students with standardized test-taking formats and strategies. They should not 
sacrifice instruction in subject-matter mastery. 
c) Eliminate the fallacious research practice that considers no-stakes tests to be 
always valid and reliable and thus trustworthy to use in “auditing” high-stakes 
tests. 
References 
Abdelfattah, F. (2010). The relationship between motivation and achievement in low-
stakes examinations. Social Behavior and Personality, 38, 159-168. 
Allalouf A., & Ben-Shakhar, G. (1998). The effect of coaching on the predictive validity 
of scholastic aptitude tests. Journal of Educational Measurement, 35(1), 31-47. 
Allensworth, E., Correa, M., & Ponisciak, S. (2008). From high school to the future: ACT 
preparation–Too much, too late: Why ACT scores are low in Chicago and what it means for 
schools. Chicago, IL: Consortium on Chicago School Research at the University of 
Chicago. 
American Educational Research Association (AERA), American Psychological 
Association (APA), & National Council on Measurement in Education (NCME). 
(1999). Standards for educational and psychological testing. Washington, DC: AERA. 
American Educational Research Association (AERA), American Psychological 
Association (APA), & National Council on Measurement in Education (NCME). 
(2013). Standards for educational and psychological testing. Washington, DC: AERA. 
Arendasy, M. E., Sommer, M., Gutierrez-Lobos, K., & Punter, J. F. (2016). Do individual 
differences in test preparation compromise the measurement fairness of admission 
tests? Intelligence, 55, 44-56. 
Revista Iberoamericana de Evaluación Educativa 
  45 
 
 
Baker, E. L. (2000). Understanding educational quality: Where validity meets technology. 
Princeton, NJ: Educational Testing Service, Policy Information Center. 
Barry, C. L., Horst, S. J., Finney, S. J., Brown, A. R., & Kopp, J. P. (2010). Do examinees 
have similar test-taking effort? A high-stakes question for low-stakes testing. 
International Journal of Testing, 10(4), 342-363. doi:10.1080/15305058.2010.508569 
Becker, B. J. (1990). Coaching for the Scholastic Aptitude Test: Further synthesis and 
appraisal. Review of Educational Research, 60(3), 373-417. 
Briggs, D. C. (2001). The effect of admissions test preparation. Chance, 14(1),10-18.  
Briggs, D., & Hansen, B. (2004). Evaluating SAT test preparation: Gains, effects, and self-
selection. Princeton, NJ: Educational Testing Service. 
Brown, S. M., & Walberg, H. J. (1993). Motivational effects on test scores of elementary 
students. Journal of Educational Research, 86(3), 133-136. 
Buckendahl, C. W., & Hunt, R. (2005). Whose rules? The relation between the “rules” 
and “law” of testing. In R. P. Phelps (Ed.), Defending standardized testing (pp. 147-
158). Mahwah, NJ: Psychology Press. 
Camara, W. (1999). Is commercial coaching for the SAT I worth the money?. New York, NY: 
College Counseling Connections. 
Camara, W. J. (2008). College admission testing: Myths and realities in an age of 
admissions hype. In R. P. Phelps (Ed.), Correcting fallacies about educational and 
psychological testing (pp. 45-76). Washington, DC: American Psychological 
Association. 
Cannell, J. J. (1987). Nationally normed elementary achievement testing in America’s public 
schools. How all fifty states are above the national average. Daniels, WV: Friends for 
Education. 
Cannell, J. J. (1989). How public educators cheat on standardized achievement tests. 
Albuquerque, NM: Friends for Education. 
Crocker, L. (2005). Teaching for the test: How and why test preparation is appropriate. 
In R. P. Phelps (Ed.), Defending standardized testing (pp. 159-174). Mahwah, NJ: 
Psychology Press. 
DerSimonian, R., & Laird, M. (1983). Evaluating the effect of coaching on SAT scores: A 
meta-analysis. Harvard Educational Review, 53, 1-5. 
Eklof, H. (2007). Test-taking motivation and mathematics performance in TIMSS 2003. 
International Journal of Testing, 7, 311-326. doi:10.1080/15305050701438074 
Fraker, G. A. (1987). The Princeton Review reviewed. The Newsletter. Deerfield, MA: 
Deerfield Academy. 
Gardner, W. (2008). Good teachers teach to the test: That's because it's eminently sound 
pedagogy. Retrieved from  
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2008/0417/p09s02-coop.html 
Koretz, D. (April, 1992). NAEP and the movement toward national testing. Paper 






Koretz, D. M. (1996). Improving America’s schools: The role of incentives. Washington, DC: 
National Academy Press. 
Koretz, D. M. (2008). Measuring up: What educational testing really tells us. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
Koretz, D. M., Linn, R. L., Dunbar, S. B., & Shepard, L. A. (April, 1991). The effects of 
high-stakes testing on achievement: Preliminary findings about generalization across tests. 
Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research 
Association, Chicago. 
Kulik, J. A., Bangert-Drowns, R. L., & Kulik, C-L. C. (1984). Effectiveness of coaching 
for aptitude tests. Psychological Bulletin, 95, 179-188. 
Linn, R. L. (2000). Assessments and accountability. Educational Researcher, 29(2), 4-16. 
Linn, R. L., Graue, M. E., & Sanders, N. M. (1990). Comparing state and district results 
to national norms: The validity of the claims that everyone is above average. 
Educational Measurement: Issues and Practice, 9(3), 5-14. 
Liu, O. L., Rios, J. A., & Borden, V. (2015). The effects of motivational instruction on 
college students' performance on low-stakes assessment. Educational Assessment, 
20(2), 79-94. doi: 10.1080/10627197.2015.1028618 
Marte, J. (2011). 10 things test-prep services won’t tell you. Market watch. Retrieved from 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/10-things-testprep-services-wont-tell-you-
1301943701454 
Mathers, C., Finney, S., & Myers, A. (2016, July). How test instructions impact motivation 
and anxiety in low-stakes settings. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the 
Psychometric Society, Asheville, NC. 
Messick, S., & Jungeblut, A. (1981). Time and method in coaching for the SAT. 
Psychological Bulletin, 89, 191-216. 
Moore, W. P. (1991). Relationships among teacher test performance pressures, perceived testing 
benefits, test preparation strategies, and student test performance (PhD dissertation). 
University of Kansas, Lawrence. 
Oliphant, R. (2011). Modern metrology and the revision of our Standards for 
Educational and Psychological Testing: An open letter to American parents. 
Nonpartisan Education Review / Essays, 7(4). Retrieved from  
http://www.nonpartisaneducation.org/Review/Essays/v7n4.pdf 
Palmer, J. S. (2002). Performance incentives, teachers, and students: Estimating the effects of 
rewards policies on classroom practices and student performance (PhD dissertation). Ohio 
State University, Columbus, Ohio. 
Phelps, R. P. (2005). The rich, robust research literature on testing’s achievement 
benefits. In R. P. Phelps (Ed.), Defending standardized testing (pp. 55-90). Mahwah, 
NJ: Psychology Press.  
Phelps, R. P. (2006). A tribute to John J. Cannell, M.D. Nonpartisan Education 
Review/Essays, 2(4). Retrieved from 
http://www.nonpartisaneducation.org/Review/Essays/v2n4.pdf 
Revista Iberoamericana de Evaluación Educativa 
  47 
 
 
Phelps, R. P. (2008/2009a). The rocky score-line of Lake Wobegon. In R. P. Phelps 
(Ed.), Correcting fallacies about educational and psychological testing (pp.102-134). 
Washington D. C.: American Psychological Association.  
Phelps, R. P. (2008/2009b). Educational achievement testing: Critiques and rebuttals. In 
R. P. Phelps (Ed.), Correcting fallacies about educational and psychological testing (pp. 66-
90). Washington D. C.: American Psychological Association. 
Phelps, R. P. (2010). The source of Lake Wobegon. Nonpartisan Education 
Review/Articles, 6(3). Retrieved from  
http://nonpartisaneducation.org/Review/Articles/v6n3.htm 
Phelps, R. P. (2011a). Standards for Educational & Psychological Testing. New Orleans, 
LA: American Psychological Association. 
Phelps, R. P. (2011b). Educator cheating is nothing new; doing something about it 
would be. Nonpartisan Education Review/Essays, 7(5). Retrieved from  
http://nonpartisaneducation.org/Review/Essays/v7n5.htm 
Phelps, R. P. (2011c). Teach to the test? The Wilson Quarterly. Retrieved from  
http://wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/fall-2013-americas-schools-4-big-
questions/teach-to-the-test/ 
Phelps, R. P. (2012a). Dismissive reviews: Academe’s Memory Hole. Academic Questions, 
25(2), 228-241.  
Phelps, R. P. (2012b). The rot festers: Another National Research Council report on 
testing. New Educational Foundations, 1(1). Retrieved from  
http://www.newfoundations.com/NEFpubs/NewEduFdnsv1n1Announce.html 
Phelps, R. P. (2014). Synergies for better learning: An international perspective on 
evaluation and assessment. Assessment in Education: Principles, Policies, & Practices, 
21(4), 481-493. doi:10.1080/0969594X.2014.921091  
Popham, W. J. (1987). The merits of measurement-driven instruction. Phi Delta Kappan, 
68, 675-682. 
Popham, W. J. (2004). All about accountability / “Teaching to the test”: An expression 
to eliminate. Educational Leadership, 62(3), 82-83. 
Powers, D. E. (1993). Coaching for the SAT: A summary of the summaries and an 
update. Educational Measurement: Issues and Practice, 39, 24-30. 
Powers, D. E., & Rock, D. A. (1999). Effects of coaching on SAT I: Reasoning test 
scores. Journal of Educational Measurement, 36(2), 93-118. 
Rios, J. A., Guo, H., Mao, L., & Liu, O. L. (2016). Evaluating the impact of careless 
responding on aggregated-scores: To filter unmotivated examinees or not? 
International Journal of Testing, 16, 1-36. doi:10.1080/15305058.2016.1231193 
Robb, T. N., & Ercanbrack, J. (1999). A study of the effect of direct test preparation on 
the TOEIC scores of Japanese university students. Teaching English as a Second or 
Foreign Language, 3(4). 
Sessoms, J., & Finney, S. J. (2015) Measuring and modeling change in examinee effort 






Shepard, L. A. (1990). Inflated test score gains: Is the problem old norms or teaching the 
test? Educational Measurement: Issues and Practice, 9(3), 15-22. 
Shepard, L. A. (April, 2000). The role of assessment in a learning culture. Presidential 
Address presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research 
Association, New Orleans. 
Smith, J. K., Given, L. M., Julien, H., Ouellette, D., & DeLong, K. (2013). Information 
literacy proficiency: Assessing the gap in high school students’ readiness for 
undergraduate academic work. Library & Information Science Research, 35, 88-96. 
Smyth, F. L. (1990). SAT coaching: What really happens to scores and how we are led 
to expect more. The Journal of College Admissions, 129, 7-16. 
Snedecor, P. J. (1989). Coaching: Does it pay-revisited. The Journal of College Admissions, 
125, 15-18. 
Staradamskis, P. (2008, Fall). Measuring up: What educational testing really tells us. 
Book review. Educational Horizons, 87(1). Retrieved from  
http://nonpartisaneducation.org/Foundation/KoretzReview.htm 
Steedle, J. T. (2014). Motivation filtering on a multi-institution assessment of general 
college outcomes. Applied Measurement in Education, 27, 58-76. doi: 
10.1080/08957347.2013.853072 
Tuckman, B. W. (April, 1994). Comparing incentive motivation to metacognitive 
strategy in its effect on achievement. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the 
American Educational Research Association, New Orleans. 
Tuckman, B. W., & Trimble, S. (August, 1997). Using tests as a performance incentive 
to motivate eighth-graders to study. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the 
American Psychological Association, Chicago.  
Wainer, H. (2011). Uneducated guesses: Using evidence to uncover misguided education policies. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Whitla, D. K. (1988). Coaching: Does it pay? Not for Harvard students. The College 
Board Review, 148, 32-35. 
Wise, S. L., & DeMars, C. E. (2005). Low examinee effort in low-stakes assessment: 
Problems and potential solutions. Educational Assessment, 10, 1-17. 
doi:10.1207/s15326977ea1001_1 
Wise, S. L., & DeMars, C. E. (2010). Examinee noneffort and the validity of program 
assessment results. Educational Assessment, 15, 27-41. 
doi:10.1080/10627191003673216 
Zehr, M. A. (2001). Study: Test-preparation courses raise scores only slightly. New York, NY: 
Education Week. 
Zilberberg, A., Anderson, R. D., Finney, S. J., & Marsh, K. R. (2013). American college 
students’ attitudes toward institutional accountability testing: Developing measures. 
Educational Assessment, 18, 208-234. doi:10.1080/10627197.2013.817153 
 
Revista Iberoamericana de Evaluación Educativa 
  49 
 
 
Breve CV del autor 
Richard P. Phelps 
Founder of the Nonpartisan Education Group and editor of its peer-reviewed journal, 
the Nonpartisan Education Review (http://nonpartisaneducation.org), a Fulbright 
Scholar, and a fellow of the Psychophysics Laboratory. He has authored, or edited and 
authored, four books on assessment policy --Correcting Fallacies about Educational and 
Psychological Testing (APA); Standardized Testing Primer (Peter Lang); Defending 
Standardized Testing (Psychology Press); and Kill the Messenger: The War on Standardized 
Testing (Transaction)– and several statistical compendia. Phelps has held positions with 
several organizations working in assessment, including ACT, AIR, ETS, the OECD, 
Pearson, and Westat. He holds degrees from Washington, Indiana, and Harvard 
Universities, and a PhD in Public Policy from the University of Pennsylvania’s 
Wharton School. ORCID ID: 0000-0003-4008-087x. Email: richardpphelps@yahoo.com 
